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Concepts of space underlie and structure design practices involved in the 
production of human environments, such as architecture, landscape design, urban 
planning, industrial design and civil engineering, for example. The implicit nature 
of concepts of space, and their close link to interpretations of self and world make 
them appropriate candidates in the pedagogy of these fields for a discussion of 
"threshold concepts" as proposed by Meyer and Land (2006).  
 
This paper contrasts the dialectical concept of space as a container and the non-
dialectical concept of networked space, conceptualised here as threshold space and 
transformational space. It asks how the latter could shift understandings of a 
complex interdisciplinary spatial design problem, namely infrastructure, the 
physical systems of mobility, communication, and environmental control that 
underpin human environments (Bélanger, 2008; Varnelis, 2009). To address this 
non-dialectical concept, it examines firstly the nature of infrastructures, arguing, as 
proposed by Varnelis (2009), that they are "networked ecologies"  or 
"hyperobjects" according to Morton (2011): open networks of effect rather than 
closed collections of equipment or fixed territories. Secondly, it considers the 
implications of this model for what is depicted as a world-view, adducing Morton's 
rejection of the idea of Nature (2007), and Harman's interpretation of Heidegger's 
analysis of tools (Heidegger, 1962; Harman, 2006). It concludes by advocating that 
a critical position termed here as being off the grid—encountering secondary or 
what Harman terms "withdrawn" (2006) aspects of infrastructural systems—should 





In J.G. Ballard's novella Concrete Island (1974), architect Robert Maitland crashes his 
Jaguar over a motorway embankment onto a traffic island, a thin triangle of waste ground 
two hundred metres long. Here, in a parody of Robinson Crusoe, he finds himself 
marooned. As Ballard writes:  
 
His jacket and trousers were stained with sweat, mud and engine grease―few 
drivers, even if they did notice him, would be eager to give him a lift. Besides, it 
would be almost impossible to slow down here and stop. The pressure of the 
following traffic, free at last from the long tail-backs that always blocked the 
Westway interchange during the rush hour, forced them on relentlessly (Ballard, 
1974: 17) 
 
The fast-flowing arms of the motorway continue to operate perfectly, ensuring the rapid 
movement of bodies and objects; but their operation is inaccessible to Maitland. 
Immobilised by the infrastructure of mobility, he has not simply exited urban life, he has 
slipped off the grid while remaining firmly within its network of effects. This paper 
presents an argument for the importance to design pedagogy and practice of a spatial 
model that can account for conditions such as  those experienced by Maitland.  
 
Space is a structuring concept, a model that underlies human activity and material 
production. The Cartesian belief that space was a transcendental absolute is now widely 
rejected. Lefebvre, for example, argued that space is a multifarious social praxis before 
being a mathematical construct (Lefebvre, 1991), while De Landa points out that even 
from a mathematical perspective there are many possible spatialities, including 
topological, Gaussian, Euclidean, and affine spaces (De Landa, 2002). As a result, no 
single concept of space underlies all the various design practices involved in the material 
production of human (and non-human) environments, such as architecture, landscape, 
urban planning, interiors, industrial design, and civil engineering. The fact that such 
concepts are not fully shared and are often implicit can make communication between 
these practices, and education in them, frustrating.  
 Alternative spatial models can act as “threshold concepts” (Meyer & Land, 2006), 
potentially effecting major shifts in the way the existence and nature of spatial 
relationships are understood by learners in this field. This transformation of perspective 
also entails a potential reconstruction of subjective identity, as the subject's own spatial 
relationships and capacities come into question. As Meyer and Land point out, threshold 
concepts are often troublesome: in the case of spatial models, this can be because of the 
potential scale of these transformations of self and world; and because concepts of space 
are commonly tacit—assumed rather than articulated (Meyer & Land, 2006: 12). 
 
Infrastructure—the physical systems of mobility, communication, and environmental 
control that underpin human environments (Bélanger, 2008; Varnelis, 2009)—presents as 
an increasingly important and complex design problem. As a determinant of shared 
environments and public spaces, there are many stakeholders, affected parties, and 
contributors to such a system. It is my contention that a shift in spatial model has the 
capacity to be transformative in educating policy-makers, planners and designers for 
infrastructures as a way of structuring and thinking about the physical world as a 
networked cultural and environmental system. 
 
I will begin by positing a topological distinction between two types of space: threshold 
space, and transformational space. I will then consider the currently prevalent forms of 
infrastructure, arguing that they are hyperobjects: open networks of effect around which 
no final horizon can be drawn; and move on to discuss ontological and pedagogical 




Thresholds of containment and transformational space 
A curve drawn on a piece of paper can be either open or closed depending on the 
coinciding of its beginning and end. A closed curve contains an interior space and 
indicates an exterior one. An open curve may create zones of partial closure, administer 
relations of proximity, or mark changes of state, but it does not establish a dialectic of 
absolute interiority and exteriority. This distinction indicates two possible types of space: 
the dialectical space of the closed curve, fundamentally split by thresholds of closure and 
containment, and the multiplicitous space of open passage, connection, and 
transformation. Adopting the terms thematised by this issue of ACCESS, I am reserving 
the term threshold space for the former, and offering the term transformational space for 
the latter.1 
 
The proposed distinction is between the idea of space as a container, and the idea of 
space as connection. In a threshold space, things, effects, and events are contained or 
exteriorised; in a transformational space they are transmitted. Harry Beck’s seminal map 
of the London Underground (1931) locates stations according to their topological 
relationship and their connections to one other, not their geographical position. For 
someone traversing the network, it is more important to know which connections are 
available at any given point and where transfers need to be made, than to know distances 
travelled or which stretches of track are underground and which are in the open air. 
Containment is secondary to connection. To pass outside in threshold space is to cross a 
line demarcating an interior, whether by choice, accident, or involuntary ejection. In 
transformational space, however, there is no strict exterior, only degrees of connection. 
Charing Cross, on Beck’s map, differs from Edgeware not because it is a more capacious 
station, with better amenities and more platforms, but because it has greater connectivity.  
 
Similarly, rban motorway networks can be usefully understood in this sense. The 
motorway folds the city, creating points of accelerated connection and compressing 
distance. The motorway cuts through the city like a street, but unlike a street, access can 
only be gained at certain strategic points where there are on-ramps. These short-circuits 
modify the connectivity of the street-grid. In doing so, they modify the ability of certain 
types of effect to propagate through the city. An accident at one point of the network can 
create congestion at another point. A business might choose to locate itself close to an on-
ramp in order to facilitate rapid transmission of its goods. From the perspective of an 
urban inhabitant, the motorway is normally considered as a space of pure connection, 
barring an accident such as  Maitland’s. In the spatial operation of the motorway, the 
question of interiority is secondary, even problematic, compared to questions of access 
and the types of effect that thereby propagate. 
 
Another way of analysing infrastructure as a cultural system of threshold space is to 
consider the cellphone network. The city is blanketed by cell-phone coverage. So long as 
I am carrying a working phone, I have access to this network, and can have remote 
effects through it. If my phone stops working, however, being ‘within’ the area of 
coverage is of no use to me. Without access, I am off the grid. From the point of view of 
a threshold spatiality, I could be said to be in the network, but without a connection or the 
capacity to have effects on other elements of the network, this would be a hollow claim. 
The dialectic of exteriority / interiority can have little to say about my situation (even if 
we were to redefine ‘in’ as meaning membership or participation: a possibility I will 
consider below when I address the edges of the network).  
 
In the twentieth century, infrastructures such as these previously discussed became one of 
the key determinants of urban form, and consequently of spatial experience and politics.2 
In directing design attention to this cultural condition an understanding of the 
nondialectical and transformational space of networks is necessary. 
 
Network culture 
Kazys Varnelis (2008) introduces his discussion of what he calls “the networking of 
public space” with a description of the commonplace experience of sitting in a café where 
individuals are paying little attention to one another; instead talking on the phone, 
emailing, download, reading, and listening to music on headphones. Wryly, Varnelis 
suggests that the café provides little more than a site where these individuals can 
“establish an ambient visual experience of bodies in near proximity… a calculated 
copresence” as they engage in their solitary pursuits (Varnelis, 2008: 17). But it would 
not be correct to see only disconnection. While they share an ambient local presence, 
these individuals are also present in other spaces and participating in other communities. 
The flâneur of the early twentieth century, at home in the streets and arcades of the city, 
has been replaced by the network-connected individual of the twenty-first, whose most 
important human interactions can be pursued remotely. Varnelis points to five conditions 
of contemporary spatial experience as characteristic of this new spatiality: "the everyday 
superimposition of real and virtual spaces, the development of a mobile sense of place, 
the emergence of popular virtual worlds, the rise of the network as a socio-spatial model, 
and the growing use of mapping and tracking technologies." (Varnelis, 2008: 15).  
 
In referring to the idea that the network is a "socio-spatial model", not just a 
technological innovation, Varnelis follows Manuel Castells, who contended that we now 
participate in an increasingly global culture dominated by networks. As Castells wrote, 
"Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of 
networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of 
production, experience, power, and culture" (Castells, 2010: 469). In their most abstract 
form, networks are comprised of nodes and connections; and although they can take on 
hierarchical forms, they are not constrained to hierarchy. Social practices and structures 
are refracted by this new globalised condition. Work, for example, becomes fragmented 
and individualised: 
 
[L]abor is disaggregated in its performance, and reintegrated in its outcome through 
a multiplicity of interconnected tasks in different sites, ushering in a new division 
of labor based on the attributes / capacities of each worker rather than on the 
organization of the task … Who are the owners, who the producers, who the 
managers, and who the servants, becomes increasingly blurred in a production 
system of variable geometry, of teamwork, of networking, outsourcing, and 
subcontracting (Castells, 2010: 471-75). 
 
Connection between tasks is decreasingly reliant on co-presence in a contained site of 
labour. The Marxist division of labour facilitates geographic dispersal. But this 
networking does not constitute a net dematerialisation, only a redistribution of materials 
and a prioritising of infrastructure. Castells remarks that: 
 
instead of the end of cities, predicted by futurologists under the conditions of 
advanced telecommunications that would make spatial concentration of people and 
activities unnecessary, we find ourselves in the largest wave of urbanization in the 
history of humankind (2010: xxxii) 
 
While “all that is solid melts into air” (Marx, 1998: 38) it also recondenses in new ways. 
Although small local bookstores might be closing in the face of competition from online 
bookstores, for instance, ever-larger warehouses and distribution networks must be built 
to service those online vendors. Similarly, the decreasing significance of physical 
branches for banks is matched by an increase in need for server farms, ATMs, and 
EFTPOS machines. As network space prioritises connection over containment; topology 
over topography, it still relies on physical infrastructure. Facing the numerous grids and 
infrastructures underpinning credit, mobility, energy, social services, food, water, 
information, and voice, the question of access becomes central. Varnelis writes: 
 
Far from the mythical distributed ideal that ideologists of technology claim it to be, 
the network has its own physicality, its own material presence. Networks rely on 
relatively few high-bandwidth transcontinental and transoceanic fiber-optic lines, 
on even fewer Tier-1 carriers that sell space on these lines, and on still fewer 
mobile-phone operators and last-mile connection (DSL or cable broadband service) 
providers that allow the end user to access bandwidth (Varnelis, 2008: 28). 
 
In spite of the apparently egalitarian logic of the network,  there is still an intricate play of 
power-relations pertaining to its controls. The term ‘access’ suggests once again a 
dialectic of interiority, when what matters is actually the capacity to have effects in the 
network, and the uneven distribution of these capacities.  
 
As Castells and Varnelis indicate, contemporary spatial production and daily experience 
are characterised by the morphology of networks. Under these conditions, social 
structures and practices like work take on new forms, becoming dispersed and 
redistributed in a way that prioritises connection over co-presence. However, the 
consequent agnosticism about distance does not result in a net dematerialisation, but a 
redistribution of material in a way that foregrounds the role of infrastructure, and the 
question of access to it. 
 
Networked ecologies and the non-existent edges of the network 
What is outside the network? Although I have argued that the question of access should 
be redrafted as a question of capacities for effect, does the network, considered as a 
whole, form an interiorised space? To address this question, it will be useful to consider 
networked ecologies, which Varnelis argues are the contemporary form of infrastructure. 
 
In the grand projects of modernist urban designers, infrastructure was a means of 
providing civic form. As Varnelis puts it, "Modernists believed in the virtues of the plan, 
the capacity of a clear idea to bring order to the chaos of the metropolis” (Varnelis, 2009: 
8). Modernist infrastructures were imagined to be optimisations of urban complexity, 
allowing the city to operate as a gigantic machine. Le Corbusier described his Ville 
Contemporaine (1922) like this: 
 
these skyscrapers will contain the city’s brains, the brains of the whole nation. They 
stand for all the careful working-out and organisation on which the general activity 
is based. Everything is concentrated in them: apparatus for abolishing time and 
space, telephones, cables and wireless; the banks, business affairs and the control of 
industry; finance, commerce, specialisation. The station is in the midst of the 
skyscrapers, the tubes run below them, and the tracks for fast traffic are at their 
base (Banham, 1960: 254). 
 
In reality, such masterplans proved far messier than their idealised presentation would 
suggest. Reyner Banham, writing in 1971, following the adoption of scepticism regarding 
such mechanistic views, celebrated the “nonplan” of Los Angeles: 
 
Conventional standards of planning do not work in Los Angeles. It feels more 
natural (I put it no stronger than that) to leave the effective planning of the area to 
mechanisms that have already given the city its present character: the infrastructure 
to giant agencies like the Division of Highways and the Metropolitan Water District 
and their like; the intermediate levels of management to the subdivision and zoning 
ordinances; the details decisions to local and private initiative; with ad-hoc 
interventions by city, State and pressure-groups formed to agitate over matters of 
clear and present need (Banham, 2009: 121). 
 
Banham was hopeful for this ad-hoc evolution of cities in response to hundreds of partial 
plans, pressures, and responsibilities; but Varnelis observes that his nonplanned city was 
as utopian as was the modernist masterplanning. The freeways he was so enamoured of 
were at the time fresh and flowing, not decaying and clogged, and he did not foresee the 
stagnation that would result from a morass of competing authorities and interests: 
 
Left unfettered, the competing interests of individuals, government bureaucracies, 
and private corporations have led to a vicious stalemate, an urban trench warfare 
that effectively undoes the city's ability to fix its problems (Varnelis, 2009: 13). 
 
In his own analysis of Los Angeles, Varnelis coins the term “networked ecology” for "a 
series of codependent systems of environmental mitigation, land-use organization, 
communication, and service delivery" (Varnelis, 2009: 15).3 These networked ecologies 
are infrastructures, but they are not singular or optimised like the ideal infrastructures 
envisaged by Le Corbusier: 
 
Rather than being executed in conformance with the outline of a plan, they are 
networked, hypercomplex systems produced by technology, laws, political 
pressures, disciplinary desires, environmental constraints and a myriad other 
pressures, tied together with feedback mechanisms (Varnelis, 2009: 15).  
 
One of his examples is the oil-drilling infrastructure that taps the reserves of Los Angeles 
City Oilfield that underlie the urban area. No single company owns this infrastructure; the 
rules that govern it are spread across local, state, and national authorities. Its sites are 
distributed: there are subterranean pipelines, downtown oil-rigs camouflaged as generic 
office buildings and offshore drilling platforms masquerading as palmy islands. This 
disparate conglomeration of facilities does not form a machinic unity, but something 
more akin to an ecology: an interconnected web of pumps, pipes, trucks, land, 
investments, drilling rights, and lobby-groups—each with dependencies and effects.  
 
Networked ecologies include specialised and esoteric infrastructures like that of prop-
houses: huge warehouses stocked with the miscellaneous props required at short notice 
for filming TV shows, music videos, and movies. These logistic centres concentrate the 
needs of the film industry alleviating the need to gather props and materials from widely 
distributed sites. No single prop-house serves as a central hub—rather, a network of 
specialised prop-houses "offer highly specialized and themed fragmentary utopias" 
(Varnelis, 2009: 222). Prop-houses gather and circulate the heterogenous objects upon 
which the fantasy sites of television and movies are built; and upon which a multi-billion 
dollar economy rides.  
 
These disaggregated and multiplicitous infrastructures (to borrow Castells’s terms) are 
constellations of elements operating with varying degrees of cohesion. They are not 
closed systems, which one can occupy or exit. Rather, they are overlapping and 
interwoven meshworks with a vast number of secondary and tertiary effects.   
 
Hyperobjects 
Infrastructures, particularly when they take on the character of networked ecologies, are 
not closed systems with interiors and exteriors. To claim that something is outside a 
networked ecology is to posit the possibility of drawing a horizon beyond which its 
effects cannot propagate; or else to discriminate against weak or remote effects. Ecologist 
Timothy Morton describes a class of objects he calls hyper-objects, "objects massively 
distributed in time and space that make us redefine what an object is" (Morton, 2011: 5). 
Climate, for example, is more than just the weather. At any given point in time I can look 
at the sky and comment on the weather, but I can only detect and describe climate 
instrumentally, by marshalling armies of sensors, recording devices, and visualisation 
machines, over a long period of time. Climate exceeds my local observations (just 
because it is snowing where I am doesn’t mean that the climate isn’t getting warmer). 
There is no total viewpoint available to me.4 
 
Infrastructures are hyperobjects, operating on scales of time and size that make any total 
viewpoint impossible (Bélanger, 2008).  Outside of Twizel, a town in the central plains of 
New Zealand's South Island, resides a security-hardened control facility administering 
nine of Meridian Energy's hydro-electric power stations. From there, technicians, by 
watching camera feeds and monitoring telemetry, are able to raise or lower the level of 
entire lakes, and even reverse the flow of the Waiau River. Although this control room 
provides a privileged view of the energy-generating network, it does not provide anything 
like a complete or full view. Cameras and sensors monitor a handful of key control-
points, but there are kilometres of unwatched canals, high-tension cables, and access 
roads. The network is affected by rainfall, local politicians, and power consumption 
habits, and in return has effects on lake and river shorelines, longfin eels, tourist ventures, 
the location of power-hungry industries, and an infinite number of other participants. The 
network is bigger and fuzzier than the neat organisation of the control-room, and it 
connects into a myriad of other systems and grids. No total viewpoint of this networked 
ecology is possible, and all encounters with it are partial. Hyperobjects cannot be 
summoned to appear within a horizon of human experience, as they recede over the 
horizon of every particular encounter. 
 
Hyperobjects can be partially mapped or traced out as networks of effects—as 
transformational spaces. The relationship between horizons and the transformational 
space of hyperobjects is neatly articulated by Gregory Bateson, who gives the example of 
a blind man making prosthetic use of a cane: 
 
Where do I start? Is my mental system bounded at the handle of the stick? Is it 
bounded by my skin? Does it start halfway up the stick? But these are nonsense 
questions. The stick is a pathway along which the transforms of difference are 
being transmitted. The way to delineate the system is to draw the limiting line in 
such a way that you do not leave things inexplicable. If what you are trying to 
explain is a given piece of behaviour, such as the locomotion of the blind man, 
then, for this purpose, you will need the street, the stick, the man; the street, the 
stick, and so on, round and round. But when the blind man sits down to eat his 
lunch, his stick and its messages will no longer be relevant—if it is his eating that 
you want to understand." (Bateson, 2000: 465). 
 
The network of transformations is continuous, and in the drawing of a horizon a “limiting 
line” is necessarily a severing of some connections. Horizons are provisional, belonging 
to a particular encounter with a network of transformations. There is no ultimate horizon, 
because there is no end to the effects and transformations that could be included in the 
network. Infrastructures are best understood as spaces in which many horizons are 
possible and none are complete, not spaces in which horizons are posited from the outset. 
To this extent infrastructures operate as transformational systems. 
 
The fallacy of the outside 
Meyer and Land suggest one of the characteristics of a threshold concept is that it may 
entail ontological shifts, changes in world-view; as well as shifts in subjective identity 
(Meyer & Land, 2006: xiv). A transformational concept of space such as the one I have 
outlined does not remain strictly bounded to a particular practical application. It carries 
ontological implications. The design of infrastructure, as conceived from a 
transformational perspective, blends with the question of world-building. An inversion 
occurs from “the world of design” to “the design of the world” (Mau, 2004: 11). In 
considering this proposition I turn now to transformations of the concept of world that are 
entailed by the spatial model in question.  
 
Pollution and the finitude of resources have been a growing part of public 
comprehension. The secondary effects of industrial processes and consumer habits are 
well-known. Waste cannot be simply ejected because it must always go somewhere, 
perhaps to return in an unexpected way; and no process can rely on endless reserves. Of 
this awareness, Bruno Latour writes: 
 [T]he notion of ‘environment’ began to occupy public consciousness precisely 
when it was realized that no human action could count on an outside environment 
any more: There is no reserve outside which the unwanted consequences of our 
collective actions could be allowed to linger and disappear from view. Literally 
there is no outside, no décharge where we could discharge the refuse of our 
activity… No outside is left … It is not only Magellan's ship [that circles the 
planet] but also our refuse, our toxic wastes and toxic loans, after several turns 
(Latour, 2009: 144). 
 
The concept of an outside falters when faced with the persistent return of the excluded. 
Where once waste could be thrown away, it is now evident, according to Latour, that 
away is always a specific location, and that it is not as distant or disconnected as might be 
hoped. The outside is a fallacy—local and remote are interlinked in a single system of 
effects and transformations. Oil seeping to the surface as a result of urban drilling in Los 
Angeles, or pollutants entering the atmosphere from oil-burning vehicles should not be 
seen as passing outside the infrastructure in question, but as aspects of it. 
 
Morton calls this insight “the ecological thought” (Morton, 2010: 1), and claims it is a 
principle with wider pertinence than practical environmentalism. One of the effects of 
Morton’s ecological thought is the obsolescence of the concept of Nature.5 He critiques 
Nature as relying on a dialectic of exterior and interior, and the possibility of an absolute 
horizon, writing: 
 
Ecology can do without a concept of a something, a thing of some kind, 'over 
yonder,' called Nature. Yet thinking, including ecological thinking, has set up 
'Nature' as a reified thing in the distance, under the sidewalk, on the other side 
where the grass is always greener, preferably in the mountains, in the wild (Morton, 
2010: 3). 
 
Nature is always projected at a distance, contends Morton, imagined to be a pure exterior. 
Any thought or practice that develops from the idea of Nature begins by carving out such 
a conceptual exterior, and distorted by the reflections introduced at the horizon.6 Nature 
is detrimental to any possibility of ecological thought, because it blinds us to connections 
and the transmission of effects with a fantasy of disconnection.7 In the same vein, 
Graham Harman argues: 
 
[T]here is no such thing as a ‘horizon’ but only a system of exchange between 
beings and their being. This system is known as 'world', a colossal infrastructure of 
humans, plants, sea mammals, gasoline, perfumes, rivers, pirate colonies, and 
opium (Harman, 2006: 155). 
 
Harman does not mean to indicate that there are no horizons of any kind, but that no pure 
horizons can exist without severing at least some lines of effect and transformation (as 
Bateson indicated above). In agreement with the cited views of Morton and Latour, 
Harman envisions “world” as “a colossal infrastructure”, an inescapable totality without 
an outside. Infrastructures are difficult to handle because they are hyperobjects that 
extend over the horizon of any individual encounter, interlinking seamlessly with this 
totality. 
 
Failure and withdrawal 
Pierre Bélanger suggests that infrastructure "remains largely invisible until the precise 
moment at which it breaks down or fails" (Bélanger, 2008). This paper began with a 
moment of infrastructural failure: Maitland's Jaguar crashing through a barrier, and 
Maitland falling off the grid. He suddenly experiences the motorway as an explicit object 
whereas previously it had functioned transparently. 
 
Turning to the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, we find an attribution of 
existential significance to the interchange between the visible and invisible aspects of an 
entity foregrounded by failure. He posits the way a tool withdraws into invisibility 
through use, but erupts into consciousness once it fails (Heidegger, 1962: 95-102). A 
hammer in use is not a subject of explicit awareness, but is simply relied upon for some 
end: perhaps building a boat or re-attaching the legs of a stool. As the hammer disappears 
into its operation, it becomes more fully itself:  
 
[T]he less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and 
use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more 
unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment (Heidegger, 1962: 
98).  
 
The being of the tool is disclosed most fully not through analysis or study, but through its 
performance. In this situation, Heidegger says the hammer is “ready-at-hand”. When the 
hammer breaks, however, and the carpenter is left staring blankly at the now-ineffective 
implement, the hammer erupts suddenly into awareness in the mode of “presence-to-
hand”. Readiness-at-hand and presence-to-hand are not separate kinds of object, but as 
Boedeker puts it, “two modes of the how-being of intraworldly entities” (Dreyfus & 
Wrathall, 2005: 159). In use, the tool refers on to the task at hand, and when its use is 
interrupted, this reference is disturbed (Heidegger, 1962: 105; Harman, 2006: 24-35).   
 
Harman argues controversially that Heidegger’s insight is not limited to human 
encounters with objects—even if Heidegger himself believed this to be the case (Harman, 
2006). He believes that withdrawal through reference and presence-to-hand through 
encounter is part of the structure of all entities.8 Paper, for example, encounters the knife 
as knife in some sense at least, even given the obvious fact that the paper does not have 
consciousness of the knife, because it clearly does not encounter it as a pebble or 
dropsaw. Each particular encounter is a moment of presence-to-hand, behind which both 
the thing encountered and the encounterer withraw into the execution of their own being 
as part of the total in its “equipmental totality” (Heidegger, 1962: 136) or “referential 
contexture” (Harman, 2006: 22).  
 
As revealed in Maitland’s encounter, the motorway as a seamless cultural system is 
broken and there is exposure of “a vast environmental backdrop supporting the thin and 
volatile layer of our explicit activities" (Harman, 2006: 18). But the motorway exceeds 
this encounter: other road-users successfully navigate its lanes, and homeless people 
sleep under its bridges. If we follow Harman’s expansion of the scope of Heidegger’s 
terms to encompass non-human encounters, we could also count the rain running off it, 
birds perching on its lighting masts, and carbon monoxide being released into the 
atmosphere. Maitland’s experience is one moment of presence-to-hand, but in each of 
these encounters there is a form of presence-to-hand, and behind them all is a withdrawal 
into the performative being of readiness-at-hand. Withdrawal could be seen as the 
hyperobjectivity of all objects: the movement by which they exceed any single encounter 
and remain always open to others. Presence-to-hand is bounded by the horizon of a 
particular encounter, but withdrawing beyond this horizon is an infinitely-connected 
equipmental totality. 
 
Off the grid 
When Maitland falls off the grid, he does not fall outside. Ballard calls into question the 
applicability of a threshold spatiality to the network by placing Maitland in an ambiguous 
position: simultaneously outside and pocketed. The bursting of a tyre triggers a 
reconfiguration of a network of elements in which Maitland finds himself even more 
deeply enmeshed. As the narrative unfolds it becomes evident that Maitland's alienation 
is not strictly an incarceration or exile, but a failure to connect: there is a phone, but he 
cannot get to it; a car stops for him, but he waves it on aggressively.  
 
Following this argument, outside pertains to threshold space, but off the grid pertains to 
transformational space. When we fall off the grid, we do not escape it by exiting across 
any absolute horizon or threshold. We remain engaged in the grid’s network of effects, 
even if those effects are indirect, remote, or weak. Off the grid is a position that exposes 
or engages these secondary effects that are masked by the horizons of specific 
encounters. As Maitland speeds along the motorway, his encounter is specific and 
bounded. Withdrawn over the horizons of this encounter, however, are a vast network of 
referrals—things operating or performing relations—that are exposed at the moment of 
his stranding. In siting ourselves off the grid, we encounter hitherto withdrawn aspects of 
the grid, but not from the perspective of a disengaged observer. Off the grid describes this 
state of being alongside, encountering obliquely something that had been operating 
previously in a transparent way. This perspective reveals potently the ontological shifts 
implicit in a transformational concept of space. From off the grid, I encounter my own 
connections in ways I had previously been unaware. My shift in perspective unveils the 
world as a referential contexture.  
 
This paper has argued for the way that an alternative spatial model—that of 
transformative space—opens up a "new and previously inaccessible" (Meyer & Land, 
2006: xv) world-view. This has particular implications not only for thinking about 
subjective conditions of living in urban environments, but also for educating policy-
makers, planners and designers working on the spatial organisation of the human 
environment. Schools of architecture and spatial design are accustomed to making space 
an explicit theme, but such conceptual thematics are perhaps less familiar in the 
pedagogies of urban planning, engineering and industrial design. The conceptual position 
of transformation as discussed here is offered as a way of extending the physicality of 
design to an ontological space of production, a structuring concept or model that 
underlies human activity. 
 
Being “off the grid” is thus a critical and transformative position to be advocated in the 
education of designers, planners, and policy-makers. I propose three benefitsthat could 
arise from the conscious application of a transformational model and an‘off-the-grid 
perspective in these diverse fields of design education. They are: 
 
1. Reducing fragmentation of design problems by disciplinary boundaries, for 
example, or according to the geographical division of the urban landscape by 
property boundaries. The ecological principle of interconnection, which a 
transformational model supports, transforms all design tasks to aspects of 
collaborative world-building. 
2.  Emphasising consideration of effects beyond phenomenal effects or effects on 
selected humans: Non-human elements such as the atmosphere, soil, materials, 
and other organisms can be considered as receivers and producers of effects; as 
can humans who might otherwise be excluded. Thus a potential exists for going 
beyond thresholds into transformative spatial configurations. 
3.  Encouraging inventive opportunism: Working with what already exists, exploiting 
what is available, and re-using what is at hand as ways of working that are valued 
more than novel but disengaged additions to the context.9 
 
These three pedagogical aspects are benefits that would be felt most keenly in the design 
of infrastructures and in learning about infrastructural issues and problems—seen as open 
networks of effect and transformation rather than closed collections of equipment, fixed 
domains or territories. 
 
I have proposed a distinction between threshold space and transformational space as 
necessary for understanding the spatiality of infrastructure and of learning. While 
threshold space proceeds from a fundamental assumption of containment, 
transformational space prioritises connections between things, and the transformations 
that take place across those connections.  
 
Morton, Latour, and Harman have provided a theoretical framework for thinking the 
condition of total interconnection indicating that the concept of an outside is based on 
drawing a horizon as a provisional artefact of a particular encounter, always severing at 
least some lines of connection and effect. Thus questions of interiority and the outside are 
not in any sense obsolete or irrelevant, but they must be allied to a robust theoretical 
model of transformational space if they are not to obscure the operation of spatial systems 
in matters of infrastructure as in learning. When things fall off the grid, they encounter 
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1. These two modes of space are by no means exclusive or binary. In fact, it is possible to 
see threshold space as a special case of transformational space, much as closed curves are 
a subset of curves in general. This argument would be akin to Manuel De Landa’s 
argument that continuous spaces give rise to discontinuous ones according to a process of 
“symmetry-breaking” (De Landa, 2002: 22-24). 
 
2. The vast urban works of Baron von Haussmann in Paris triggered an attempt by 
Camillo Sitte to avoid infrastructural dominance by emphasising urban ‘rooms,’ which he 
saw as offering a more humane spatial experience. Modernist historian Siegfried Giedion 
wrote that Sitte “was a kind of troubadour, ineffectually pitting his medieval songs 
against the din of modern industry” (Giedion, 1954: 683-84). From the opposite 
direction, Le Corbusier’s urban proposals for Rio de Janeiro, Algiers, and Zlín attempted 
to assimilate the role of infrastructural engineer and urban planner to the architect. This 
would prove overly ambitious (Frampton, 1992: 180-82). 
 
3. Banham had described four 'ecologies' in 1960s Los Angeles: “Surfurbia”, “the 
Foothills”, “the Plains of Id”, and “Autopia”. Each designated an urban region, except for 
Autopia, which was what he designated the interconnecting freeway system (Banham, 
2009). Varnelis’s networked ecologies are overlaid rather than constituting regions. 
 
4. Morton argues that hyperobjects are not circumscribed by their relation to humans at 
all. They form the basis of a critique of anthropocentric thinking that proceeds in much 
the same way that Quentin Meillassoux critiques anthropocentric “correlationism” with 
reference to “arche-fossils”, objects that are claimed to precede the possibility of human 
intentionality (Meillassoux, 2008). 
 
5. Morton capitalises the term to draw attention to its historically situated status as a 
proper name, and “highlight its ‘unnatural’ qualities” (Morton, 2010: 3). 
 
6. “In the idea of pristine wilderness, we can make out the mirror image of private 
property: Keep of the Grass, Do Not Touch, Not for Sale. Nature was a special kind of 
private property, without an owner, exhibited in a specially constructed art gallery” 
(Morton, 2010, 6). 
 
7. Latour argues that the outside was only ever an effect of a conceptual manoeuvre that 
carved out an interior, the domain of human concerns and productions, and an exterior, 
the domain of nature. In We Have Never Been Modern (1993), he claims that such a 
distinction is in fact the foundational act of modernity; and since such a distinction has 
never actually been successfully maintained between these two leaky domains, we have 
consequently never been modern at all. 
 
8. In this, he explicitly runs against mainstream phenomenological interpreters of 
Heidegger such as Boedeker, who writes: “Presence-to-hand is neither a super-property 
nor a formal structure common to everything existent. Instead, it is one of several ways in 
which we can encounter entities” (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005: 159). Harman rejects the 
premising of human encounter, claiming, “Heidegger chooses to embezzle from the 
realm of common sense the ontic assumption that humans are very different from knives 
and paper” (Harman, 2006: 30)—an assumption he asserts that Heidegger never 
sufficiently argumes. 
 
9. Varnelis proposes a new kind of urbanist, who “might very well resemble a hacker, in 
the best sense, re-imagining how to appropriate the codes, rules, and systems that make 
up the contemporary city and manipulate them so as to create not a plan but a new kind of 
urban intervention” (Varnelis, 2009: 16). 
